Noise-immunity Kazan quantum line at 143 km regular fiber link by Bannik, Oleg I. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
10
01
1v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
22
 O
ct 
20
19
Noise-immunity Kazan quantum line at 143 km regular fiber link
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We experimentally demonstrate a long-distance quantum communication at 143 km between the
city of Kazan and the urban-type village of Apastovo in the Republic of Tatarstan by using quantum
key distribution prototype providing high noise-immunity of network lines and nodes due to phase
coding in subcarrier wave. Average secret key generation rate was 12 bits per second with losses
in the line of 37 decibels for a distance of 143 km during 16.5 hours of continuous field test. The
commercialization perspectives of the demonstrated long-range QKD system are discussed.
INTERCITY QUANTUM NETWORKS
One of the first commercial system of quantum key
distribution (QKD) using a standard fiber-optic channel
in urban communication line between the Swiss cities of
Geneva and Lausanne was implemented in the work [1].
The key distribution was demonstrated over a distance
of 67 km at a wavelength of 1550 nm with a quantum
secret key rate (SKR) of about 60 bits per second (bps).
This system used a phase-coded BB84 protocol [2, 3], the
main components of which were a polarization beamsplit-
ter, phase modulator and single-photon detection module
capable of operating at room temperature. In most quan-
tum communication schemes [4–9], the expensive critical
element is the photon detector, which largely determines
the quantum signal utilization, signal to noise ratio, cost
and reliability of the system, as well as its main func-
tionality and complexity of maintenance during opera-
tion. Currently, to ensure high quantum communica-
tion (QC) devices performance, two main types of quan-
tum detectors are widely used: single-photon avalanche
detector (SPAD) [10, 11] and high-efficiency supercon-
ducting single-photon detector (SSPD) [12–16]. Promis-
ing results for stable urban quantum networks and long-
distance QCs have been recently obtained with SPAD
and SSPD detectors.
QC with SPAD. The well-known demonstration of a
commercial quantum communication system, described
in work [1], contained a SPAD detector composed of a
cooled Peltier avalanche photodiode. In [17], by using
phase-coding BB84 protocol [18, 19] with Mach-Zehnder
interferometers, UK-Japan group presented the proto-
type of a high bit rate QKD system providing a total
of 878 Gbit of secure key data over a 34 day period that
corresponded to a sustained key rate of around 300 kbps.
The system was deployed over a standard 45 km link of
an installed metropolitan telecommunication fiber net-
work in central Tokyo. The prototype of QKD system is
compact, robust and automatically stabilised, enabling
key distribution during diverse weather conditions. The
security analysis has been performed for this system by
taking into account finite key size effects, decoy states [20]
with a quantified key failure probability of ǫ = 10−10.
Recently, Chinese group, known for creating a quan-
tum satellite [21], in [22] presented integration of QKD
on polarization coding decoy-state BB84 protocol [21,
23, 24] with a commercial long-distance network of 3.6
Tbps classical data at 21 dBm launch power over 66 km
fiber. This scheme is quite noise immunity in relation
to the influences on devices in network nodes, since it
does not contain interferometers, and is based on po-
larizing devices. With 20 GHz pass-band filtering and
large effective core area fibers, real-time secure key rates
can reach 4.5 kbps and 5.1 kbps for co-propagation and
counter-propagation at the maximum launch power, re-
spectively. This demonstrates feasibility and represents
an important step towards building a quantum network
that coexists with the current trunk fiber infrastructure
of classical communications. A significant increase in the
maximum range of QKD systems is achieved by replacing
SPAD detector with SSPD detector.
QC with SSPD. Ultra fast BB84 QKD transmission
at 625 MHz clock rate through a 97 km field-installed
fiber using practical clock synchronization based on
wavelength-divisionmultiplexing for time-bin coding pro-
tocol with Mach-Zehnder interferometers was demon-
strated by Japan group in [25]. The QC has been im-
plemented over-one-hour stable secret key generation at
a 800 bps with low quantum bit error rate (QBER) of
2.9 % where the quantum information was additionally
protected using decoy method [26]. These results open
the way to global secure QCs capable of functioning at
high losses in working optical lines [27].
The experimental results for a long-term field trial of
1-GHz clock QKD were presented in [28] by using the
differential phase shift coding scheme [29] with Mach-
Zehnder interferometers incorporated in the test-bed op-
tical fiber network installed in the Tokyo metropolitan
area. A photon transmitter and a photon receiver were
connected to the 90 km loop-back optical link with 30
dB loss. SSPD detectors were employed to detect pho-
tons with a low dark count rate. Stable maintenance-free
2operation was achieved for 25 days, where the average se-
cure key generation rate 1.1 ± 0.5 kbps and the quantum
bit error rate 2.6%. The experiments have shown a sig-
nificant impact of meteorological conditions on the main
parameters of QKD system.
To move from existing commercial QKD-systems oper-
ating at distances of about 100 km to new solutions stable
at ultra-long distances about of 150-200 km, it is desir-
able to use optical schemes that do not include interfer-
ometers. In this work we realized stable interferometer-
free one-way QKD system at 143 km regular fiber line by
using subcarrier waves phase-coding protocol and discuss
prospective of this system for ultra-long distance QC.
NOISE IMMUNITY PROTOTYPE FOR
ULTRA-LONG DISTANCE QC
Noise immunity problem. Noise immunity and ac-
tive intelligent stabilization [30–32] are very impor-
tant characteristics of systems for ultra-long distance
QCs. The characteristics allow to classify the existing
long-distance QCs [33, 34] by using extensive quantum
analysis [35] (traditional for cryptography) and intelli-
gent noise-analysis [36–39] (traditional for steganogra-
phy, friend identification systems and general type com-
plex systems). For solution of the problems of noise im-
munity in relation to the influences on both the fiber
communication line and QKD apparatus in the network
nodes, we must accordingly abandon the use of interfer-
ometers [40] reducing vibration resistance of nodes and
polarization coding sensitive to deformations, vibration
and temperature changes in the fiber.
Phase-coding as a solution. The unique noise immu-
nity is inherent to the subcarrier wave phase-coding pro-
tocol [41] what distinguishes this approach from many
others [42–44]. A quantum signal is not directly gener-
ated by the source in the one-way QKD system of sub-
carrier frequencies, but is created as a result of phase
modulation of carrier wave at Alice and Bob sides [41].
A description of a typical technological implementation
of this protocol can be found in [45]. Below we offer a
modified variant of this QKD-system.
Components and properties. We propose a QKD-
system of one-way QC shown in Fig. 1. Tunable wave-
length continuous wave mode DFB-laser with 5 kHz fre-
quency linewidth was used as a carrier wavelength source
for quantum channel. The wavelength was adjusted in
accordance with the filter bandwidth in the receiving
unit (Bob side). The laser radiation was launched to
the electro-optical amplitude modulator for generation of
short phase modulator was a sequence of 2.5 ns pulses at
the repetition rate of 100 MHz. Then the generated pulse
were transmitted to the optical phase modulator (OPM)
providing uniform phase modulation over the entire pulse
duration. 4.8 GHz electromagnetic field was also applied
to the radio-frequency input of OPM to generate optical
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Figure 1. One-way scheme for the long-distance QC complex.
DL1 and DL2: diode laser 1 and 2; OI: optical isolator; OAM:
optical amplitude modulator; OPM: optical phase modulator;
OA: optical attenuator; FPGA: field-programmable gated-
array and these serve (in conjunction with the control com-
puters) as the control apparatus of this system; VCO: volt-
age control oscillator; PLL: phase looked loop; EPM: elec-
trical phase modulator; AMD: amplitude modulator driver;
CDC: chromatic dispersion compensator; PC: polarization
controller; F: optical filter; SSPD: superconducting single-
photon detector; EF: electrical filter; D: photodiode; Φ: opti-
cal phase modulator; CC: classical computer.
sidebands. The relative phase of the subcarrier waves is
determined by the phase of the modulating electromag-
netic field with modulation index of 0.033. Further, the
optical signal was attenuated by the variable attenua-
tor to the sidebands power level defined by the protocol,
namely, no more than 0.2 photons per modulation cy-
cle. Chromatic dispersion compensator was introduced
to eliminate the detrimental influence of chromatic dis-
persion effect on the interferometric visibility on the re-
ceiver unit side. Alice overall output power was 79.3 pW.
Both Alice’s and Bob’s phase modulators contained an
linear polarizer aligned with the electro-optical crystal
axis to ensure fully modulated signal.
To maximize signal utilization, Bob used a polarization
controller at its input to compensate for polarization dis-
tortions introduced by the fiber optics line. Following
the maximum counting rate at the output of a single-
photon detector, the controller automatically aligns the
signal polarization along the axis of the OPM polarizer.
After the phase modulation, the input light was filtered
at narrow band notch filter.
Our approach uses only one sideband, introducing an
additional 3 dB signal loss, while that allows us to filter
out both carrier wavelength and fiber line background
spurious noise in a cheap simple way using only one spec-
tral filter. One of the sidebands is launched to a SSPD-
detector. SSPD operates at a temperature of 2.1 K and
has a low dark count rate of 0.5 Hz with a high quantum
efficiency of 50 %.
EXPERIMENTAL DEMONSTRATION
For the field tests, we used Kazan-Apastovo regular
fiber link with a length of 143 km and losses of 37 dB
3in the quantum channel and 45 dB in the synchroniza-
tion channel with erbium-doped fiber amplifier. The to-
tal time for continuous testing was 16.5 hours. About
700 kbit of key information was generated in the quan-
tum channel with an average value of the secret quantum
key generation rate of 12 bps. The value of QBER was
in the stable range from 0.5 % to 3.5 %, on average, the
value of QBER ∼ 2 % (see Fig. 2). This generation rate
allows to change the 256-bit encryption key up to two
times per minute. The data of the stable experimental
demonstration show the possible using of the proposed
QKD system in commercial long-range QCs.
In our work, the results were obtained in a long-
distance and regular trunk telecommunication fiber be-
tween the cities of the Russian Federation. Basic char-
acteristics of the tests of our QKD system for urban
quantum networks [46, 47] and intercity trunk lines [48]
are presented in Tab. I. For comparison, Tab. I also
presents the basic characteristics of the well-known long-
range QKD systems discussed in the introduction which
were also tested under real conditions [49].
Kazan quantum lines
Length SKR Detector Loss (dB); Group
(km) (bps) QBER (%)
12 2 · 104 ∗SPAD 7; 4 Russia
143 12 †SSPD 37; 2 Russia
International commercial systems
67 60 [1] SPAD 14; 6 Switzerland
45 3 · 105 [17] SPAD 14; 4 Japan
66 5 · 105 [22] SPAD 21; 5 China
97 800 [25] SSPD 33; 3 Japan
90 1 · 103 [28] SSPD 30; 3 Japan
Table I. Basic characteristics of the proposed QKD system:
∗Kazan city quantum network (previous field tests, Kazan,
May 2017 [46, 47]), †intercity long-distance QC (current ex-
periment, Kazan-Apastovo, August 2019 [48]).
It is worth noting that in [50, 51] and [52, 53] tests of var-
ious QKD systems at shorter distances and using ultra-
low loss fibers are presented.
INNOVATION OUTLOOK
Based on the demonstrated QKD prototype, we pro-
pose the concept of a universal QC complex ”Kazan-Q1”
(see outlook Tab. II and patents [54–58]) which combines
the technological simple solutions, noise immunity of the
subcarrier wave coding and robust quantum-classical in-
formation protection based on the extended statistical
data mining against new types of quantum attacks [59].
We see the following distinctive features and prospects
for the development of the long-distance QC complex
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Figure 2. Distributions for (a) secret key rate (∼ 12 bps) and
(b) QBER (∼ 2%) for two-day measurements.
Name Kazan-Q1 Detector SSPD
or SPAD
Coding Phase in Active Phase
subcarrier wave element modulator
Security Quantum and QRNG On PD with
classical robust-defense
Noise Network nodes Decoys and Amplitude
immunity and lines diagnostics modulator and AI
Table II. Outlook for the complex ”Kazan-Q1”. Here: QRNG:
quantum random number generator; PD: PIN-photodiode;
AI: artificial intelligence.
”Kazan-Q1” in the context of world achievements in the
area of innovative quantum technologies:
1) statistical monitoring with AI for keys and electronic
components based on the robust nonparametric criteria
[37, 60–63];
2) compact [64–66] planar implementation [67] without
using interferometers for the main components [9]: beam
splitter [68–70], planar phase modulator [71], high purity
4QRNG on PD [72] with robust-defense [61, 73–76];
3) implementation of advanced decoy states [77, 78] in
a complex using intelligent monitoring methods [37, 61]
for quantum diagnostics of network integrity and intru-
sion detection [79–81];
4) advanced post-processing [82] for error correction
and modeling in optical simulator for testing and spe-
cialization of software for specific urban conditions.
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